Abstract. Justification logics are epistemic logics that explicitly include justifications for the agents' knowledge. We develop a multi-agent justification logic with evidence terms for individual agents as well as for common knowledge. We define a Kripke-style semantics that is similar to Fitting's semantics for the Logic of Proofs LP. We show the soundness, completeness, and finite model property of our multi-agent justification logic with respect to this Kripke-style semantics. We demonstrate that our logic is a conservative extension of Yavorskaya's minimal bimodal explicit evidence logic, which is a two-agent version of LP. We discuss the relationship of our logic to the multi-agent modal logic S4 with common knowledge. Finally, we give a brief analysis of the coordinated attack problem in the newly developed language of our logic.
Introduction
Justification logics [Art08] are epistemic logics that explicitly include justifications for the agents' knowledge. The first logic of this kind, the Logic of Proofs LP, was developed by Artemov [Art95, Art01] to provide the modal logic S4 with provability semantics. The language of justification logics has also been used to create a new approach to the logical omniscience problem [AK09] and to study self-referential proofs [Kuz10] .
Instead of statements A is known, denoted A, justification logics reason about justifications for knowledge by using the construct [t]A to formalize statements t is a justification for A, where evidence term t can be viewed as an informal justification or a formal mathematical proof depending on the application. Evidence terms are built by means of operations that correspond to the axioms of S4, as is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Artemov [Art01] has shown that the Logic of Proofs LP is an explicit counterpart of the modal logic S4 in the following formal sense: each theorem of LP becomes a theorem of S4 if all terms are replaced with the modality ; and, vice versa, each theorem of S4 can be transformed into a theorem of LP if occurrences of modality are replaced with suitable evidence terms. The latter process is called realization, and the statement of correspondence is called a realization theorem. Note that the operation + introduced by the sum axiom in Fig. 1 does not have a modal analog, but it is an essential part of the proof of the realization theorem in [Art01] . Explicit counterparts for many normal modal logics between K and S5 have been developed (see a recent survey in [Art08] and a uniform proof of realization theorems for all single-agent justification logics forthcoming in [BGK10] ). The notion of common knowledge is essential in the area of multi-agent systems, where coordination among agents is a central issue. The standard textbooks [FHMV95, MvdH95] provide excellent introductions to epistemic logics in general and common knowledge in particular. Informally, common knowledge of A is defined as the infinitary conjunction everybody knows A and everybody knows that everybody knows A and so on. This is equivalent to saying that common knowledge of A is the greatest fixed point of λX.(everybody knows A and everybody knows X) .
(1)
Artemov [Art06] has created an explicit counterpart of McCarthy's any fool knows common knowledge modality [MSHI78] , where common knowledge of A is defined as an arbitrary fixed point of (1). The relationship between the traditional common knowledge from [FHMV95, MvdH95] and McCarthy's version is studied in [Ant07] .
In this paper, we present a multi-agent justification logic with evidence terms for individual agents as well as for common knowledge, with the intention to provide an explicit counterpart of the h-agent modal logic of traditional common knowledge S4 C h . Multi-agent justification logics with evidence terms for each agent have been considered in [Yav08, Ren09a, Art10] , although common knowledge is not present in any of them. Artemov's interest [Art10] lies mostly in exploring a case of two agents with unequal epistemic powers, e.g., Artemov's Observer has sufficient evidence to reproduce his Object Agent's thinking, but not vice versa. Yavorskaya [Yav08] studies various operations of evidence transfer between agents. Among their systems, Yavorskaya's minimal 1 bimodal explicit evidence logic, which is an explicit counterpart of S4 2 , is the closest to our system. We will show that in the case of two agents our system is its conservative extension. Finally, Renne's system [Ren09a] combines features of modal and dynamic epistemic logics, and hence cannot be directly compared to our system. An epistemic semantics for LP, F-models, was created by Fitting in [Fit05] by augmenting Kripke models with an evidence function that specifies which formulae are evidenced by a term at a given world. It is easily extended to the whole family of single-agent justification logics (for details, see [Art08] ). In [Art06] Artemov extends F-models to justification terms for McCarthy's common knowledge modality in the presence of several ordinary modalities, creating the most general type of epistemic models, sometimes called AF-models, where common evidence terms are given their own accessibility relation not directly dependent on the accessibility relations for individual modalities. Yavorskaya in [Yav08] proves a stronger completeness theorem with respect to singleton F-models, independently introduced by Mkrtychev [Mkr97] and now known as M-models, where the role of the accessibility relation is completely taken over by the evidence function.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce the language and give the axiomatization of a family of multi-agent justification logics with common knowledge. In Sect. 3, we prove their basic properties including the internalization property, which is characteristic of all justification logics. In Sect. 4, we give a Fitting-style semantics similar to AF-models and prove soundness and completeness with respect to this semantics as well as with respect to singleton models, thereby demonstrating the finite model property. In Sect. 5, we show that for the two-agent case, our logic is a conservative extension of Yavorskaya's minimal bimodal explicit evidence logic. In Sect. 6, we show how our logic is related to the modal logic of traditional common knowledge and discuss the problem of realization. Finally, in Sect. 7, we provide an analysis of the coordinated attack problem in our logic.
Syntax
To create an explicit counterpart of the modal logic of common knowledge S4 C h , we use its axiomatization via the induction axiom from [MvdH95] rather than via the induction rule to facilitate the proof of the internalization property for the resulting justification logic. We supply each agent with its own copy of terms from the Logic of Proofs, while terms for common and mutual knowledge employ additional operations. As motivated in [BKS09] , a proof of CA can be thought of as an infinite list of proofs of the conjuncts E m A in the representation of common knowledge through an infinite conjunction. To generate a finite representation of this infinite list, we use an explicit counterpart of the induction axiom by means of two unary co-closure operations ccl 1 (·) and ccl 2 (·). Evidence terms for mutual knowledge are represented as tuples of the individual agents' evidence terms with the standard operation of tupling and with h unary projections. While only two of the three operations on LP terms are adopted for common knowledge evidence and none for mutual knowledge evidence, it will be shown in Sect. 3 that most remaining operations are definable with the notable exception of inspection for mutual knowledge.
We consider a system of h agents. Throughout the paper, i always denotes an element of {1, . . . , h}, * always denotes an element of {1, . . . , h, C}, and always denotes an element of {1, . . . , h, E, C}.
Let Cons := {c 1 , c 2 , . . . } and Var := {x 1 , x 2 , . . . } be countable sets of proof constants and proof variables respectively for each . The sets Tm 1 , . . . , Tm h , Tm E , and Tm C of evidence terms for individual agents and for mutual and common knowledge respectively are inductively defined as follows:
1. Cons ⊆ Tm ; 2. Var ⊆ Tm ; 3. ! i t ∈ Tm i for any t ∈ Tm i ; 4. t + * s ∈ Tm * and t · * s ∈ Tm * for any t, s ∈ Tm * ; 5. t 1 , . . . , t h ∈ Tm E for any t 1 ∈ Tm 1 , . . . , t h ∈ Tm h ; 6. π i t ∈ Tm i for any t ∈ Tm E ; 7. ccl 1 (t) ∈ Tm E and ccl 2 (t) ∈ Tm E for any t ∈ Tm C ; 8. ind(t, s) ∈ Tm C for any t ∈ Tm C and any s ∈ Tm E . Tm := Tm 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tm h ∪ Tm E ∪ Tm C denotes the set of all evidence terms. The indices of the operations !, +, and · will usually be omitted if they can be inferred from the context. Let Prop := {P 1 , P 2 , . . . } be a countable set of propositional variables. Formulae are denoted by A, B, C, etc. and defined by the following grammar
where t ∈ Tm . The set of all formulae is denoted by Fm LP C h . We adopt the following convention: whenever a formula [t] A is used, it is assumed to be wellformed, i.e., it is implicitly assumed that term t ∈ Tm . This enables us to omit the explicit typification of terms.
Axioms of LP
A constant specification CS is any subset By LP C h we denote the system LP C h (CS) with
For an arbitrary CS, we write ∆ CS A to state that A is derivable from ∆ in LP C h (CS) and omit the mention of CS when working with the constant specification from (2) by writing ∆ A. We use ∆, A to mean ∆ ∪ {A}.
Basic Properties
In this section, we show that our logic possesses the standard properties expected of any justification logic. In addition, we show that the operations on terms introduced in the previous section are sufficient to express the operations of sum and application for mutual knowledge evidence and the operation of inspection for common knowledge evidence. This is the reason why + E , · E , and ! C are not primitive connectives in the language. It should be noted that no inspection operation for mutual evidence terms can be defined, which follows from Lemma 27 in Sect. 6 and the fact that EA → EEA is not a valid modal formula.
We begin with the following observation:
Lemma 1. For any constant specification CS and any formulae A and B:
(E-application) 3. for any t, s ∈ Tm E , there is a term t + E s ∈ Tm E such that
(E-sum) 4. for any t ∈ Tm C and any i ∈ {1, . . . , h}, there is a term ↓ i t ∈ Tm i such that
(C-reflexivity)
Proof. 1. Immediate by the projection and reflexivity axioms.
5. Immediate by 4. and the reflexivity axiom.
Unlike Lemma 1, the next lemma requires that a constant specification CS be C-axiomatically appropriate.
Lemma 2. Let CS be C-axiomatically appropriate and A be a formula. 1. For any t ∈ Tm C , there is a term ! C t ∈ Tm C such that
(C-inspection) 2. For any t ∈ Tm C , there is a term t ∈ Tm C such that
The following two theorems are standard in justification logics. Their proofs can be taken almost word for word from [Art01] and are, therefore, omitted here.
Lemma 3 (Deduction Theorem). Let CS be a constant specification and
Lemma 4 (Substitution). For any constant specification CS, any proposi-
, any x ∈ Var , and any t ∈ Tm ,
where A(x/t, P/B) denotes the formula obtained by simultaneously replacing all occurrences of x in A with t and all occurrences of P in A with B, accordingly for ∆(x/t, P/B) and CS(x/t, P/B).
The following lemma states that our logic can internalize its own proofs, which is an important property of justification logics.
Lemma 5 (C-lifting). Let CS be a pure C-axiomatically appropriate constant specification. If
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of A. If A is an axiom, there is a constant c ∈ Tm C such that [c] C A ∈ CS because CS is C-axiomatically appropriate. Then take and use axiom necessitation, axiom necessitation and i-conversion, or axiom necessitation and the co-closure axiom respectively.
For
and use C-inspection, C-inspection and i-conversion, or the co-closure axiom respectively. For A = C j , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, take t := y j ∈ Var for a fresh variable y j . For A derived by modus ponens from D → A and D, by induction hypothesis there are terms r , s ∈ Tm such that [r ] (D → A) and [s ] D are provable. Take t := r · s and use -application, which is an axiom for = i and for = C or follows from Lemma 1 for = E. For A = [c] C E ∈ CS derived by axiom necessitation, take
and use C-inspection, C-inspection and i-conversion, or the co-closure axiom respectively.
Corollary 6 (Constructive necessitation). Let CS be a pure C-axiomatically appropriate constant specification. For any formula A, if CS A, then for each , there is a ground term t ∈ Tm such that
The following two lemmas show that our system LP C h can internalize versions of the induction rule used in various axiomatizations of S4 C h (see [BKS09] for a discussion of several axiomatizations of this kind).
Lemma 7 (Internalized induction rule 1). Let CS be a pure C-axiomatically appropriate constant specification. For any formula A,
Proof. By constructive necessitation, there exists a term t ∈ Tm C such that
. It remains to use the induction axiom and propositional reasoning.
Lemma 8 (Internalized induction rule 2). Let CS be a pure C-axiomatically appropriate constant specification. For any formulae A and B, if we have
From this we immediately get
. Thus, by Lemma 7, there is a t ∈ Tm C with
Since CS is C-axiomatically appropriate, there is a constant c ∈ Tm C such that
Making use of C-application, we find by (4) and (5) that
From (3) we get by E-reflexivity that CS B → A ∧ B. This, together with (6),
Soundness and Completeness
Definition 9. An AF-model meeting a constant specification CS is a structure M = (W, R, E, ν), where (W, R, ν) is a Kripke model for S4 h with a set of possible worlds W = ∅, with a function R : {1, . . . , h} → P(W ×W ) that assigns a reflexive and transitive accessibility relation on W to each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , h}, and with a truth valuation ν : Prop → P(W ). We always write R i instead of R(i) and define the accessibility relations for mutual and common knowledge in the standard way:
An evidence function E : W × Tm → P Fm LP C h determines the formulae evidenced by a term at a world. We define E := E (W × Tm ). Note that whenever A ∈ E (w, t), it follows that t ∈ Tm . The evidence function E must satisfy the following closure conditions: for any worlds w, v ∈ W ,
When the model is clear from the context, we will directly refer to R 1 , . . . , R h , R E , R C , E 1 , . . . , E h , E E , E C , W , and ν.
Definition 10. A ternary relation M, w A for formula A being satisfied at a world w ∈ W in an AF-model M = (W, R, E, ν) is defined by induction on the structure of the formula A: 1. M, w P if and only if w ∈ ν(P ); 2. behaves classically with respect to the propositional connectives; 3. M, w [t] A if and only if 1) A ∈ E (w, t) and 2) M, v A for all v ∈ W with (w, v) ∈ R .
We write M A if M, w A for all w ∈ W . We write CS A and say that formula A is valid with respect to CS if M A for all AF-models M meeting CS.
Lemma 11 (Soundness). Provable formulae are valid: CS A implies CS A.
Proof. Let M = (W, R, E, ν) be an AF-model meeting CS and let w ∈ W . We show soundness by induction on the derivation of A. The cases for propositional tautologies, for the application, sum, reflexivity, and inspection axioms, and for modus ponens rule are the same as for the single-agent case in [Fit05] 
with (w, v) ∈ R i and 2) A ∈ E i (w, t i ). So, by the tupling closure condition, A ∈ E E (w, t 1 , . . . , t h ) from 2). Since by
A for all v ∈ W with (w, v) ∈ R E and 2) A ∈ E E (w, t). By the projection closure condition, it follows from 2) that A ∈ E i (w, π i t). In addition, since
, by the co-closure closure condition, A ∈ E E (w, ccl 1 (t)) and
. From the second assumption and the reflexivity of R C , we get M, w A → [s] E A; thus, M, w [s] E A by the first assumption. So A ∈ E E (w, s) and, by the second assumption, A → [s] E A ∈ E C (w, t). By the induction closure condition, we have A ∈ E C (w, ind(t, s)). To show M, v A for all v ∈ W with (w, v) ∈ R C , we prove that M, v A for all v ∈ W with (w, v) ∈ (R E ) n by induction on the positive integer n. The base case n = 1 immediately follows from M,
(axiom necessitation) Let A be an axiom and c be a proof constant such that
[c] A ∈ CS. Since A is an axiom, M, w A for all w ∈ W , as shown above. Since M is an AF-model meeting CS, we also have A ∈ E (w, c) for all w ∈ W by the constant specification closure condition. Thus, M, w [c] A for all w ∈ W .
Definition 12. Let CS be a constant specification. A set Φ of formulae is called CS-consistent if Φ CS φ for some formula φ. A set Φ is called maximal CSconsistent if it is CS-consistent and has no CS-consistent proper extensions.
Whenever safe, we do not mention the constant specification and only talk about consistent and maximal consistent sets. It can be easily shown that maximal consistent sets contain all axioms of LP C h and are closed under modus ponens.
Definition 13. For a set Φ of formulae, we define Φ/ := {A : there is a t ∈ Tm such that [t] A ∈ Φ} .
Definition 14. Let CS be a constant specification. The canonical AF-model M = (W, R, E, ν) meeting CS is defined as follows:
4. ν(P n ) := {w ∈ W : P n ∈ w}.
Lemma 15. Let CS be a constant specification. The canonical AF-model meeting CS is an AF-model meeting CS.
Proof. The proof of reflexivity and transitivity of each R i , as well as the argument for the constant specification, application, sum, and inspection closure conditions, is the same as in the single-agent case (see [Fit05] ). We show the remaining five closure conditions:
Therefore, by the tupling axiom and maximal consistency, [ t 1 , . . . , t h ] E A ∈ w. Thus, A ∈ E E (w, t 1 , . . . , t h ). (projection) Assume A ∈ E E (w, t). Thus, we have [t] E A ∈ w. Then, by the projection axiom and maximal consistency, [π i t] i A ∈ w, and thus A ∈ E i (w, π i t). (co-closure) Assume A ∈ E C (w, t). Thus, [t] C A ∈ w, and, by the co-closure axioms and maximal consistency, [ccl 1 (t)] E A ∈ w and [ccl 2 (t)] E [t] C A ∈ w. Hence, A ∈ E E (w, ccl 1 (t)) and [t] C A ∈ E E (w, ccl 2 (t)).
and the induction axiom, it follows by maximal consistency that A ∈ w and [ind(t, s)] C A ∈ w. Therefore, A ∈ E C (w, ind(t, s)). (monotonicity) We show only the case of * = C since the other cases are the same as in [Fit05] . It is sufficient to prove by induction on the positive integer n that
Base case n = 1. Assume (w, v) ∈ R E , i.e., w/i ⊆ v for some i.
The argument for the induction step is similar. Now assume (w, v) ∈ R C = ∞ n=1 (R E ) n and A ∈ E C (w, t), i.e., [t] C A ∈ w. As shown above, [t] C A ∈ v. Thus, A ∈ E C (v, t).
Remark 16. Let R C denote the binary relation on W given by (w, v) ∈ R C if and only if w/C ⊆ v .
An argument similar to the one just used for monotonicity shows that R C ⊆ R C . However, the converse does not hold for any pure C-axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS, which we demonstrate by adapting an example from [MvdH95] . Let
This set is CS-consistent for any P ∈ Prop.
To see this, let Φ ⊆ Φ be finite and let m denote the maximal number of terms such that [
for all n ∈ N and terms s ∈ Tm;
-ν N (P ) := {1, 2, . . . , m + 1} ⊆ N. Clearly, N meets any constant specification; in particular, it meets CS. It can also be easily verified that N , 1 Φ ; therefore, Φ is CS-consistent.
Since Φ is CS-consistent, there exists a maximal CS-consistent set w ⊇ Φ. Let us show that the set Ψ := {¬P } ∪ (w/C) is also CS-consistent. Indeed, if it were not the case, there would exist formulae B 1 , . . . , B n ∈ w/C such that
Then, by Corollary 6, there would exist a term s ∈ Tm C such that
But this would imply [(. . . (s · t 1 ) · · · t n−1 ) · t n ] C P ∈ w for [t j ] C B j ∈ w, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, a contradiction with the consistency of w.
Let v be a maximal CS-consistent set that contains Ψ , i.e., v ⊇ Ψ . Clearly, w/C ⊆ v, i.e., (w, v) ∈ R C , but (w, v) / ∈ R C because this would imply P ∈ v, which cannot happen. It follows that R C R C .
Similarly, we can define R E by (w, v) ∈ R E if and only if w/E ⊆ v. However, R E = R E for any C-axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS. Indeed, is easy to show that R E ⊆ R E . For the converse, assume (w, v) / ∈ R E , then (w, v) / ∈ R i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ h. So there are formulae A 1 , . . . , A h such that
Lemma 17 (Truth Lemma). Let CS be a constant specification and M be the canonical AF-model meeting CS. For all formulae A and all worlds w ∈ W , A ∈ w if and only if M, w A .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of A. The cases for propositional variables and propositional connectives are immediate by the definition of and by the maximal consistency of w. We check the remaining cases: Case A is [t] i B. Assume A ∈ w. Then B ∈ w/i and B ∈ E i (w, t). Consider any v such that (w, v) ∈ R i . Since w/i ⊆ v, it follows that B ∈ v, and thus, by induction hypothesis, M, v B. And M, w A immediately follows from this. For the converse, assume M, w [t] i B. By definition of we get B ∈ E i (w, t), from which [t] i B ∈ w immediately follows by definition of E i . Case A is [t] E B. Assume A ∈ w and consider any v such that (w, v) ∈ R E . Then (w, v) ∈ R i for some 1 ≤ i ≤ h, i.e., w/i ⊆ v. By definition of E E , we get B ∈ E E (w, t). By maximal consistency of w, it follows that [π i t] i B ∈ w, and thus B ∈ w/i ⊆ v. Since, by induction hypothesis, M, v B, we conclude that M, w A. The argument for the converse repeats the one from the previous case. Case A is [t] C B. Assume A ∈ w and consider any v such that (w, v) ∈ R C , i.e., (w, v) ∈ (R E ) n for some n ≥ 1. As in the previous cases, B ∈ E C (w, t) by definition of E C . By (7) we find A ∈ v, and thus, by C-reflexivity and maximal consistency, also B ∈ v. Hence, by the induction hypothesis M, v B. Now M, w A immediately follows. The argument for the converse repeats the one from the previous cases.
Note that the converse directions in the proof above are far from trivial in the modal case, see e.g. [MvdH95] . The last case, in particular, usually requires more sophisticated methods that guarantee the finiteness of the model. Proof. Soundness has already been shown in Lemma 11. For completeness, let M be the canonical AF-model meeting CS and assume CS A. Then {¬A} is CS-consistent and hence is contained in some maximal CS-consistent set w ∈ W . So, by Lemma 17, M, w ¬A, and hence, by Lemma 15, CS A.
Theorem 18 (Completeness). LP
M-models were introduced as semantics for LP by Mkrtychev [Mkr97] . They form a subclass of F-models (see [Fit05] ).
Definition 19. An M-model is a singleton AF-model.
Theorem 20 (Completeness with respect to M-models). LP
C h (CS) is also sound and complete with respect to the class of M-models meeting CS.
Proof. Soundness follows immediately from Lemma 11. Now assume that CS A, then {¬A} is CS-consistent, and hence M, w ¬A for some world w 0 ∈ W in the canonical AF-model M = (W, R, E, ν) meeting CS.
Let M = (W , R , E , ν ) be the restriction of M to {w 0 }, i.e., W := {w 0 }, R := {(w 0 , w 0 )} for any , E := E (W × Tm), and ν (P n ) := ν(P n ) ∩ W .
Since M is clearly an M-model meeting CS, it remains to demonstrate that M , w 0 B if and only if M, w 0 B for all formulae B. We proceed by induction on the structure of B. The cases where either B is a propositional variable or its primary connective is propositional are trivial. Therefore, we only show the case of B = [t] C. First, observe that M, w 0 [t] C if and only if C ∈ E (w 0 , t) .
Indeed, by Lemma 17, M, w 0
[t] C if and only if [t] C ∈ w 0 , which, by definition of the canonical AF-model, is equivalent to C ∈ E (w 0 , t) = E (w 0 , t).
Corollary 21 (Finite model property). LP C h (CS) enjoys the finite model property with respect to AF-models.
Conservativity
Yavorskaya in [Yav08] introduced a two-agent version of LP, which we extend to an arbitrary h in the natural way:
Definition 22. The language of LP h is obtained from that of LP C h by restricting the set of operations to · i , + i , and ! i and by dropping all terms from Tm E and Tm C . The axioms are restricted to application, sum, reflexivity, and inspection for each i. The definition of constant specification is changed accordingly.
We show that LP C h is conservative over LP h by adapting a technique from [Fit08] .
Definition 23. The mapping × : Fm LP C h → Fm LP h is defined as follows: 1. P × := P for propositional variables P ∈ Prop; 2. × commutes with propositional connectives;
Theorem 24. Let CS be a constant specification for LP C h . For an arbitrary for-
Proof. Since A × = A for any A ∈ Fm LP h , it suffices to demonstrate that for any
which can be done by induction on the derivation of D.
Case when D is a propositional tautology, then so is
, an instance of the reflexivity axiom of LP h or a propositional tautology respectively.
is an instance of the application axiom. We distinguish the following possibilities: 
Both t and s contain a subterm from Tm
is an instance of the tupling axiom. We distinguish the following possibilities: 1. At least one of the t i 's contains a subterm from Tm E ∪ Tm C . Then D × has the form C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C h → B × with at least one C i = B × and is, therefore, a propositional tautology. 
None of the t i 's contains a subterm from Tm
Another option is to use Fitting's concept of embedding one justification logic into another, which involves replacing constants in D with more complicated terms in D × (see [Fit08] for details).
Forgetful Projection and a Word on Realization
Most justification logics are introduced as explicit counterparts to particular modal logics in the strict sense described in Sect. 1. Although the realization theorem for LP C h remains an open problem, in this section we prove that each theorem of our logic LP C h states a valid modal fact if all terms are replaced with the corresponding modalities, which is one direction of the realization theorem. We also discuss approaches to the harder opposite direction.
We start with recalling the modal language of common knowledge. Modal formulae are defined by the following grammar
where P j ∈ Prop. The set of all modal formulae is denoted by Fm S4 C h .
The Hilbert system S4 C h [MvdH95] is given by the modal axioms of S4 for individual agents, by the necessitation rule for 1 , . . . , h , and C, by modus ponens, and by the axioms
Definition 26 (Forgetful projection). The mapping
h is defined as follows: 1. P
• := P for propositional variables P ∈ Prop; 2.
• commutes with propositional connectives; 3.
Lemma 27. Let CS be any constant specification. For any formula
Proof. The proof is by easy induction on the derivation of A.
Definition 28 (Realization).
A realization is a mapping r :
We usually write A r instead of r(A).
We can think of a realization as a function that replaces occurrences of modal operators (including E and C) with evidence terms of the corresponding type. The problem of realization for a given pure C-axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS can be stated as follows:
Is there a realization r such that LP
A positive answer to this question would constitute the harder direction of the realization theorem, which is often demonstrated using induction on a cut-free sequent proof of the modal formula.
Cut-free systems for S4
C h are presented in [AJ05] and [BS09] . They are based on an infinitary ω-rule of the form
However, realization of such a rule meets with serious difficulties in reaching uniformity among the realizations of the approximants E m A. A finitary cut-free system is obtained in [JKS07] by finitizing this ω-rule via the finite model property. Unfortunately, the "somewhat unusual" structural properties of the resulting system (see discussion in [JKS07] ) make it hard to use it for realization.
The non-constructive, semantic realization method from [Fit05] cannot be applied directly because of the non-standard behavior of the canonical model (see Remark 16).
Perhaps the infinitary system presented in [BKS09] , which is finitely branching but admits infinite branches, can help in proving the realization theorem for LP C h . For now this remains work in progress.
Coordinated attack
To illustrate our logic, we will now analyze the coordinated attack problem along the lines of [FHMV95] , where additional references can be found. Let us briefly recall this classical problem. Suppose two divisions of an army, located in different places, are about to attack an enemy. They have some means of communication, but these may be unreliable, and the only way to secure a victory is to attack simultaneously. How should generals G and H who command the two divisions coordinate their attacks? Of course, general G could send a message m G 1 with the time of attack to general H. Let us use the proposition del to denote the fact that the message with the time of attack has been delivered. If the generals trust the authenticity of the message, say because of a signature, the message itself can be taken as evidence that it has been delivered. So general H, upon receiving the message, knows the time of attack, i.e., m G 1 H del . However, since communication is unreliable, G considers it possible that his message has not been delivered. But if general H sends an acknowledgment m H 2 , he in turn cannot be sure whether the acknowledgment has reached G, which prompts yet another acknowledgment m G 3 by general G, and so on. In fact, common knowledge of del is a necessary condition for the attack. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume it to be common knowledge between the generals that they should only attack simultaneously or not attack at all, i.e., that they attack only if both know that they attack: [t] C (att → [s] E att) for some terms s and t. Thus, by the induction axiom, we get att → [ind(t, s)] C att. Another reasonable assumption is that it is common knowledge that neither general attacks unless the message with the time of attack has been delivered: [r] C (att → del ) for some term r. Using the application axiom, we obtain att → [r · ind(t, s)] C del .
We now show that common knowledge of del cannot be achieved and that, therefore, no attack will take place, no matter how many messages and acknowledgments m Our analysis of the coordinated attack problem in the language of LP C h shows that access to explicit evidence creates more alternatives than the classical modal approach. In particular, the lack of knowledge can occur either because messages are not delivered or because evidence of authenticity is missing.
We have mostly concentrated on the study of C-axiomatically appropriate constant specifications. For modeling distributed systems with different reasoning capabilities of agents, it is also interesting to consider i-axiomatic appropriate, E-axiomatic appropriate, and mixed constant specifications, where only certain aspects of reasoning are common knowledge.
We established soundness and completeness with respect to AF-models and singleton M-models. Can other semantics for justification logics such as (arithmetical) provability semantics [Art95, Art01] and game semantics [Ren09b] be adapted to LP 
